Kurdistan Rising

Major Points
-The Kurdish Regional Government is sheltering Iraqi refugees
-Kurdish Peshmerga Forces have secured Kirkuk, Iraq from the ISIL
-Kurdish national interest in territorial expansion in Iraq to Mosul
-Turkish conflict of interest, Kurdish Oil vs. Kurdish secession in Turkey
-Supporting Peshmerga forces – a wise investment for the US?

June 11, Erbil - Peshmerga Soldier guards incoming refugees from Mosul, Reuters

Securing Kirkuk

Around this time a year ago, I found myself in a compact hotel gym in the west end of Amman, somewhat tactlessly asking an Iraqi I had just met (tactless by American standards – Arabs are fairly direct) about the security situation in his country. At the time the fervor of a potential American strike against the Assad Regime in Syria had consumed the region, and news from Iraq was sparse, aside from the reports of sectarian violence and mosques being bombed. I wasn’t going to miss the opportunity for a first hand account. He nodded solemnly about the Sunni-Shia conflict in the south, but suggested that northern Iraq was perfectly safe and worth a visit, that is Iraqi Kurdistan. When asked if he was a Kurd, he smirked, nodded, and continued “My family is safe and I am successful, what more could a man want?”

I hope this still holds true in light of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant seizing control of Baghdad’s northern and western tributaries this week, namely the cities of Mosul, Baiji, Tikrit, and Samarra, and Ramadi and Falluja, respectively. And it very well might. While Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki is holed up in Baghdad alongside the majority of the Iraqi security forces who abandoned their posts when ISIL militants attacked, it would appear the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are not simply holding their own along the border of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. They have succeeded in securing the city of Kirkuk in the Ta’mm province after briefly clashing with the ISIL following the Iraqi security forces’ retreat.

However while taking in 200,000-300,000 Iraqi refugees fleeing the ISIL in Mosul, in addition to ~200,000 Syrian refugees already in northern Iraq, was an act of humanitarian altruism, securing Kirkuk Thursday morning, was not. The oil laden city, often considered a “Kurdish Jerusalem,” has long been the subject of opposing claims from the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil and Iraq proper. In the past two days, Maliki’s administration may as well have dropped that claim all together.

Qala Erbil, Tom Blackwell

                Kurdish Ambition and Iraqi Acquiescence 

On June 11^th despite economic and territorial tensions between them, Baghdad called upon the autonomous Kurdish region to aid Iraqi Security Forces against the ISIL threat. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s did not comply with Maliki’s request for reinforcement immediately– not that the Iraqi Security Forces’ rapid rate of retreat would have provided for any extensive cooperation if it had. Rather, the Kurdish authority perceptibly deliberated on the matter; but Peshmerga forces have since been deployed. Speculation over concessions being made by Baghdad to secure this Kurdish assistance soon followed the brief impasse although the Kurdistan Regional Government had denied any such gestures. 

However, with Kirkuk under Kurdish control as of June 12^th after Baghdad having essentially green lighted Kurdish military expeditions on northern Iraqi soil, any future Iraqi land ‘concessions’ will only be the attempts of Maliki’s administration to save face. Effectively as of this moment Kirkuk is Kurdish. The Iraqi parliament has little say in the matter, as they're dependent upon the Peshmerga’s assistance and protection of Iraqi refugees. Barring the interference of foreign powers, Maliki's administration has effectively conceded any territory secured to the Kurds in exchange for maintaining a northern front against the Sunni militants. But is further territorial expansion the Kurdish intention at this time with the ISIL looming just miles away?

1992, Map of the Kurdish Population, CIA -edited to include the current borders of Iraqi Kurdistan

In a quote given to Al Jazeera, Shoresh Haji, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, lays bare the current Kurdish mentality, “I hope that the Kurdish leadership will not miss this golden opportunity to bring Kurdish lands in the disputed territories back under Kurdish control. It is a very sad situation for Mosul, but at the same time, history has presented us with only one or two other moments at which we could regain our territory and this is an opportunity we cannot ignore. We must regain the territory and protect its inhabitants from attack by the terrorists. This time we must stay on the Kurdish land and then negotiate with Baghdad, not withdraw and then negotiate.” By all means, while conscious of the renewed threat of Sunni militant neighbors the Kurdistan Regional Government is readily aware of Iraq’s weakness and the historic opportunity at hand. It seems it’s no longer a question of if the Kurdistan Regional Government will seek to expand, but when and how far? As the map above reveals, the Kurdish people had diffused considerably further south in Iraq, by as early as 1992, than the borders allotted the Kurdish Regional Government with Iraqi republic’s renewal in 2005 (denoted by blue outline, sharing the north eastern border of Iraq). Ideal Kurdish expansion in Iraq would likely stretch to Mosul and the surrounding territories as well.

But what would this mean for said “inhabitants,” namely Iraqi nationals who do not identify as Kurdish, but live in these lands? Erbil has been an incredibly generous host thus far, reopening its schools –closed for summer- to shelter the influx of Iraqi refugees, providing them with electricity and water. Should Peshmerga fighters advance on cities held by the ISIL I would expect them to be welcomed as liberators by the Iraqi people and I have faith that the Kurdistan Regional Government would treat them justly, lest it conduct elicit international sanctions paralyzing their nascent economy just beginning to see wealth of oil production. Some conflict might arise with a Kurdish bid for independence in the future, however if that were the case, a few Iraqis in their territory would be the least of their concerns.

Despite this theorized territorial expansion and murmurs of independence that would accompany it, little love would be lost between Iraq and Kurdistan. While Maliki’s Iraq is certainly not Saddam’s regime, which committed genocide against the Kurdish people during the al-Anfal campaign at the close Iran-Iraq War, employing chemical weapons against Kurdish soldiers and civilians alike, the Kurdish and Iraqi governments have grown increasingly estranged since 2012. The autonomous Kurdish region has been continuously inching towards independence. Just last week, Erbil announced the sale over one million barrels of Kurdish oil to world markets through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, without Baghdad’s authorization. Now with the sudden shift in the geo-strategic balance in Iraq resulting from the ISIL invasion, it would seem Kurdish territorial and national aspirations are materializing before their eyes and effectively the Iraqi government has already consented to it, hoping simply to salvage what remains of their country when the smoke clears.

A Conflict of Turkish Interests

The movement of the Peshmerga forces however has not gone unnoticed on the international stage. If there was ever a time in the 21^st century when territorial expansion might not only be tolerated but tacitly supported by the majority of the world, it would be here and now. In its desperation, Baghdad has already consented and few if any states would oppose stemming the advances of the ISIL. However, this mounting Kurdish ambition does trouble the other states housing Kurdish populations, such as Iran and Syria, but most notably Turkey.

As the aforementioned Kurdish oil’s access to a Turkish port might’ve hinted, Turkey and Kurdistan Regional Government maintain a special trade alliance and economic relationship, with Turkish goods flooding Kurdistan, whilst Kurdish exports reach the world through Turkish ports. However Ankara is acutely aware that the actions of the Peshmarga and Kurdish national aspirations in Iraq, will only spur on Kurdish secessionists in Anatolia, namely the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is considered a terrorist organization by NATO and the European Union. Likewise if Erdogan was to aid his Kurdish ally in Iraq against the ISIL, he’d risk losing the footing he’d established in Syria; Turkey has tolerated the growth of this al-Qaeda offshoot to destabilize both the Assad Regime and the foothold the Syrian Kurds had carved out in the north east. Conversely, Turkish oil interests in northern Iraq are certainly in jeopardy with the ISIL occupation and Turkey would enjoy the unhindered flow of Kurdish oil, free of Baghdad’s control. Ankara will play the field for the time being with their final decision being predicated on Washington’s course of action. Whilst neither outcome is without cost,Turkey does stands to benefit in either instance.

December 2012 -  Kurdish Tanks 250km from Baghdad, Reuters

 The Military Capability of the Peshmerga   

As Washington deliberates on the proper response to the ISIL offensive, officials would do well to remember the events leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. In July 2002, the CIA Special Activities Division was already on the ground in northern Iraq, followed closely, by 10^th Special Forces Group (Airbourne) to organize and train the Peshmerga. Kurdish sabotage teams proved effective at infiltrating regime territory and choking off Iraqi Army supply lines. Likewise Kurdish intelligence that al-Qaeda affiliates, fleeing Afghanistan in 2002 had taken up residence in the mountains along the north east border proved true. Consequently in 2003 the joint effort of the Peshmerga, the CIA SAD, and 10^th Special Force Group, known as the Northern Iraq Liaison Element, engaged Ansar al-Islam and successfully liberated the mountain territories, albeit some of the enemy combatants did slip back into Iran. Perhaps the truest testament to the capability of the Peshmerga was at the very start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the complexities of the US-Turkish relationship prevented coalition forces from entering Iraq from the North, NILE stood alone against Saddam’s forces and succeeded in preventing the northern army from meeting the invading coalition forces in the south, saving countless US lives. Admittedly these feats took place over 10 years ago, but they demonstrate the Peshmerga’s ability to work alongside U.S. Special Forces. Likewise in the realm of raw military capability the Peshmerga could still prove a wise investment.

Current estimates place the Peshmerga around 200,000 strong, and relatively armed to teeth for a nation without a state. Kurdistan was never commanded to disarm in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom and was consequently able to collect the armaments left behind by Saddam’s forces. Historically however, the Peshmerga’s training been economically limited, but now with the rise of their oil economy they can finally afford ammo to sufficiently train on their heavy weaponry as well. And as evidenced in Kirkuk, the Peshmerga are able to combat the ISIL, despite its access to arms left behind by Iraqi security forces. Certainly a part of these weapons have gone to the conflict in Syria already, but these Sunni militants are more than aware of the value of oil producing cities like Baiji and Kirkuk. It would be naïve to think the ISIL, which has exhibited unprecedented organization in this offensive, would’ve left Kirkuk minimally equipped. Nevertheless the Kurdish forces succeeded in securing it.

From a point of strategy, the ISIL has also turned its primary attention in Iraq upon Baghdad and Shia holy sites of Karbala and Najah in the south, making an attack from the Kurdish north ideal. And albeit outside the realm of physical evidence of military capability, a sociologist might also point to their history, noting that their misfortunes are arguably second in the region only to the Palestinian people, and recognize the resolve it has forged within them. The United States trained and armed two nations to oppose al-Qaeda and tyranny during our time in Iraq. When the time came and ISIL offensive began, one dropped its guns and fled, the other saw an opportunity for territorial expansion and met the ISIL head on. Which would you back?  

Admittedly Ankara may be displeased with such a decision in the short-term, although in this age of de facto states and ethnic identities giving way to autonomous nations, Turkey will have to come to terms with its Kurdish population soon enough. Some more cautious US officials may be concerned of losing Erdogan’s support, to maintain pressure on northern shore of the Black Sea, should the PKK become dangerously active again and this is a valid consideration. I'm certain Washington can find leverage over Ankara if it came to that however. Ultimately, as long as Kurdistan is still dependent upon Turkish ports and their economic relationship remains intact, ideally Erdogan should consent.

For Baghdad, losing territory to Kurdistan, may only increase sectarian tensions in the short term. Some concerns have been raised about Maliki's reaction to Kurdish advances. As stated, he's effectively sacrificed any claim to the disputed territories, but Kurdish leadership would be wise to keep a weary eye on the southern horizon, lest Iraqi artillery fire be ill-aimed or ill-timed. If Iraq is ever to make any substantial progress however, it needs to establish a government that equitably represents both sects of Islam and isn’t a chess piece in a larger Sunni-Shia, Saudi-Iranian game for control of the Middle East. A security force that doesn’t flee at the sight of a black flag might be preferable as well. A pipedream, indeed. In the meantime in the interest of effective military intervention, minimal US ground presence, and avoiding the old paradigm of 'having to destroy a country to save it,' perhaps we let the Kurds have their day?