Monday, June 30, 2014

Redefining 'Jihad'

Challenging the Rhetoric of Extremism

al-Aqsa, Jerusalem, Asim Bharwani
Following the events of 9/11, the word ‘jihad’ was thrust into Western discourse with polemicists flagrantly misusing and abusing it, defining it as ‘holy war.’ But is this jihad? In the West’s haste to assimilate this word into its dialogue, attempting to reassure its people of their renewed safety and their leaders’ knowledge of this new enemy, it did not take the time to establish a full understanding or question the source of its exposure. Translating jihad as ‘holy war’ does not reflect an acquaintance with Islam but instead the rhetoric of terrorists who have hijacked this ancillary of faith. Muslim extremists cloak their uninhibited acts of violence and terrorism with the cloth of jihad, having distorted and debased it to justify their blatant disregard for the sanctity of human life and the spirit of Islam. The Quran defines acceptable conduct and motivation for Muslims to wage war but this supposed “jihad” rarely abides by few if any of these rules. It’s not the jihad or the righteous warfare defending Islam of Muhammad and the Rashidun’s time. It’s nothing more than wanton murder and bedlam, a crime already known to Islamic jurisprudence as hirabah.

This corruption of jihad coupled with the silence and tacit consent of the Muslim majority, and the West’s blind adherence to the terrorists’ language -intrinsically condoning their crimes against humanity as a noble struggle in the name of Allah - insults and vilifies Islam and its nation. Furthermore it drives the stake between the West and dar al-Islam deeper, hindering any potential cooperation and escalating the injustices and conflicts of the past, ultimately allowing once marginalized extremism to flourish in this system of needless mutual antagonism. This needs to change, and that begins with enlightenment, honesty, and mutual understanding. This essay pursues that goal through two means. First, it seeks to establish a more complete understanding of jihad, its sanctity, and an array of its interpretations, dispelling both the belligerent operationalization of jihad by Muslim extremists, permitting the slaughter of innocent women and children and misrepresenting the spirit of Islam, and the pacification and oversimplification of jihad endorsed by both Muslim and Western apologists. Secondly it proposes a solution for the West’s flawed use of “jihad,” which inherently alienates the peaceful Muslim majority, advocating for its replacement with “hirabah,” which properly defines and maligns the extremists’ conduct as the crime against humanity and the sin before Allah it is. Ideally this reeducation and redefining will not only break down the extremists’ support base but barrier they’ve built between Islam and the West as well.

In Modern Standard Arabic the word jihad (جهاد‎) can function grammatically as a noun or as the verb, jahada (جهد‎), and translates to a “struggle” or the act of “exerting oneself for a purpose,” religious or secular. Secularly, it’s used to describe movements for women’s rights, such as that of Egyptian feminist Huda Sha’arawi, as well as Mahatma Gandhi’s struggle for Indian independence, [1] both of which exemplify nonviolence. To truly comprehend the nature of religious Jihad however, one must first acknowledge the 14 centuries of Islamic scholarship, which has birthed a vast multiplicity of thought and interpretations, colored by historical conditions and sectarian and legal adherences. In short, the spirit of jihad has evolved over time and adapted to the diversity of the Muslims and Islamic thought.[2] Ultimately however the noble Quran and the hadiths, namely the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad, are the only true religious authority to be recognized in Islam and subsequently, our discussion begins there.

Within the Quran, jihad is often being found in the expression, al-jihad fii sabilillah (الجهاد في سبيل الله) which means, “striving or struggling in the way of Allah.” But what does it mean to struggle in god’s way? The spiritual nature of jihad is defined by the Quran’s enunciations of the Muslims’ religious duties, as within the surat al-Hajj, or the Chapter of Pilgrimage.   

“And strive for Allah with the striving due to Him. He has chosen you and has not placed upon you in the religion any hardship. [It is] the religion of your father, Abraham. Allah named you "Muslims" before [in former scriptures] and in this [revelation] that the Messenger may be a witness over you and you may be witnesses over the people. So establish prayer and give zakah and hold fast to Allah. He is your protector; and excellent is the protector, and excellent is the helper.” (22:78) 

In this passage jihad is translated as striving for Allah expressly by being a good Muslim and adhering to Islam’s five pillars of faith; this verse specifically references bearing witness or shahada, prayer "salat", fasting "sawm", and tithing "zakat", with the sura as a whole discussing the fifth pillar, hajj or pilgrimage. One can then understand jihad to be the continued affirmation of faith, the constant inner, spiritual struggle for righteousness, always endeavoring to fulfill one’s duties to Allah and one's community. Islamic scholar Mahmoud Ayoub describes "The goal of true jihad is to attain a harmony between Islam (submission), Iman (faith), and Ihsan (righteous living).” For a Muslim, jihad is the act of endeavoring to fulfill God's will, recognizing both man's imperfection and his divine ability to strive in the way of Allah despite himself.
 
Salat, Old Dubai, David Lisbona
Jihad does not intrinsically imply violence and certainly not “holy war.” However in application, “striving in the way of Allah” as revealed within the Quran and the hadith, can constitute warfare in the defense and extension of Islam. To clarify, the Quran never uses “jihad” to specifically describe combat or violence, instead employing “qital” (قتال) and “harb” (حرب) as fighting and war respectively. However based upon the understanding of jihad established in this discussion, the Quran’s revelations relating to warfare may be included within the duty of jihad. Consequently despite the best intentions on the part of Western scholars seeking to promote interfaith dialogue and Muslim apologists attempting to depict jihad in a flat, pacified light, no discussion of jihad is complete without an acknowledgement of fiats and principles of Islamic warfare.[3] By no means is this grounds for the immediate arraignment of this ancillary of faith, which symbolizes much more than simply armed struggle, or arraignment of Islam, as Islamic Scholar, Robert D. Crane notes, “The resort to physical force is justified in every religion to defend the human rights of oneself and others.” [4] Islam reserves the same right as the other Abrahamic traditions to defend itself, and this right is asserted within its holy text.

Among the most frequently cited Quranic revelations, defining Islamic rationale for warfare are verses 190-193 of surat al-Baqarah, the Chapter of the Cow, 
“Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not aggress and initiate the fight. Indeed. Allah does not like aggressors.” (2:190) 
“And kill them (those who would fight you) wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-Haram (the Kaaba, literally the Sacred Mosque) until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.” (2:191) 
“And if they cease, then indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.” (2:192) 
“Fight them until there is no fitnah and worship is for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors.” (2:193) 

Foremost, these passages support only defensive warfare, making a point against initiating conflict in 2:190, noting Allah’s disdain for aggressors (معتدين). In these passages fitnah (فتنة) is understood as persecution and oppression of the Muslims. And as 2:191 posits that the aggressors’ fitnah is only a worse offense than the Muslims’ retaliatory killing; murder is still an offense and is certainly not sanctified or open endedly justified, solely in the instance of defending Islam is it forgiven, after which the same principle of forgiveness is iterated for the aggressors, should their belligerency, persecution, and ignorance of monotheism cease. Historically such a defense became necessary for the Umma (the Muslim community) with the passing of Muhammad’s uncle, Abu-Talib, after which the first Muslims no longer enjoyed the Hashemite clan’s protection in Mecca. The Meccan Quraysh, were fearful of the threat Islam posed to the Mecca’s economy which was built on pilgrimage to the still pagan Kaaba. In turn, Qurayshi persecution forced the Muslims to emigrate to Medina (the hijra), where the Quraysh continued to dog them.[5] Jihad only acquired a military dimension in response the oppressive practices and continued assaults of the Meccan Quraysh against Muslims, attempting to stem their faith.[6]

This verse found in the surat at-Tawbah or the chapter of repentance is likewise considered a defining revelation for Islamic warfare, 
“Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the scripture until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled.” (9:29) 

This passage vindicates war against pagans on the basis of their polytheism, rather than requiring the Umma’s defense as a casus belli. Depending upon one’s interpretation it may be an early appearance of Islam’s tolerance for the other faiths of the Abrahamic tradition or it may however sanction Muslim conflict with the other monotheistic faiths as well. [5] The word translated as “scripture” in this instance is literally “books” and it may very well refer to the scriptures of Judaism and Christianity, suggesting that all monotheisms fall under the same God and are different paths to same end. This tolerance for the other monotheistic faiths is exemplified by the dhimmi system established under the Islamic Caliphate, in which Jews, Christians, and Sabians lived peacefully under Islamic rule with relative equality, humbly accepting to pay the jizyah or tax. The Dhimmi status would come to include Buddhists, Hindus, and numerous smaller faiths such as the Baha'i faith and the Druze. For some extremists however, justification for Christians and Jews being redefined as infidels is articulated within this sura however, as it acknowledges an enemy to be found among those who permit that which Islam forbids. Christianity’s triumph of Jesus’ divinity and Judaism’s of Ezra’s and both their hierarchical structures are strictly considered idol worship in Islam as evidenced in these sura, 

“The Jews say, "Ezra is the son of Allah "; and the Christians say, "The Messiah is the son of Allah ." That is their statement from their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved [before them]. May Allah destroy them; how are they deluded?” (9:30)


 “They have taken their scholars and monks as lords besides Allah, and [also] the Messiah, the son of Mary. And they were not commanded except to worship one God; there is no deity except Him. Exalted is He above whatever they associate with Him.” (9:31)

It is crucial to note however that the reiteration of Allah’s command to fight later in the sura, 
 “… And fight against the disbelievers one and one as they fight against you…”  (9:36) refers to the other adherents to the other Abrahamic traditions, mistaken in their idolatry,  as disbelievers, (المشركين) rather than polytheists or infidels (الذين كفروا), marking a significant distinction between the two. The clause, “as they fight against you” is in effect for the disbelievers, evoking only defensive warfare against other monotheists, ultimately leaving their judgment to Allah should they be peaceful. Only amongst pagans, for whom dhimmi status was not extended, is warfare unrestricted. The question of Islam’s need for defense would be raised in 20th century however with colonialism, globalization, the rise of Israel, and the subsequent bloodshed.

Returning to the nature of jihad, the aforementioned Quranic verses and others, suggest that striving in the way of Allah, consists not only of continued affirmation of one’s faith but coming to its defense as well. But is there a ranking to this? In a well-known, albeit oft contested hadith, in which the companion of Muhammad, Jabir ibn Abd-Allah, reports that "The Prophet returned from one of his battles, and thereupon told us, 'You have arrived with an excellent arrival, you have come from the Lesser Jihad to the Greater Jihad—the striving of a servant against his desires." Muhammad refers to the physical struggle for Islam’s defense as the lesser jihad in this hadith with the internal struggle, namely the lust of these warriors returning from battle, being deemed a greater trial. The 11th century, Islamic Scholar, al-Khatib al-Baghdadi’s reference to this hadith in his work, The History of Bagdad established the scholarly precedent for the ranking of jihad in this manner. If one is to give this hadith any credence, the spirit of jihad as a whole is certainly not the solely violent, armed struggle extremists have reduced it to. As Middle Eastern historians Goldschmidt and Davidson note, “To protect the Umma, Muslims must first cleanse their souls of error, pride, and forgetfulness. Islam is a religion of community every Muslim is a brother or a sister to every other Muslim. If some err, or forget their duties to God or to other Muslims, the others… must correct them.”[5] Islam’s defense or jihad begins with the spiritual not the physical. This interpretation also evokes jihad on the communal level, which is supported by in the surat Ali Imran as well, 
 “And let there be [arising] from you a nation inviting to it [all that is] good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, and they will be successful,” (3:104) suggesting that a Muslim is not only responsible for his or her personal affirmation of faith, but their community’s as well.[7] It is not enough for a Muslim to strive in the way of Allah; they must enjoin others to as well, whether within their community or by extending the invitation to the dar al da’wah, or the house of those still to learn of Allah.[4] The da’wah¸ or the extension of Islam’s invitation and the corresponding education is another facet of jihad, which comprised thirteen years of the Prophet's 23-year mission to spread Islam.[7]

Islamic jurisprudence and scholarship on the nature of jihad is incredibly vast and consequently this discussion will only briefly overview a few select scholars and is by no means a complete study. It does however convey that this notion of jihad as a spiritual struggle and continued affirmation of faith as well as Islam’s physical defense is not limited to this interpretation. In his Muqaddimaat, the Sunni Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd, divides Jihad into four types: jihad of the heart or one’s self, jihad by the tongue, jihad by the hand, and jihad by the sword. Jihad of the heart and by the sword can be understood as the greater and lesser jihads respectively.  He clarifies "Jihad by the tongue" as "to commend good conduct and forbid the wrong, drawing on the surat at-Tawbah, 
 “Oh Prophet! Strive hard against the unbelievers and the hypocrites.” (9:73) As such his jihad of the tongue echoes the aforementioned principles of the communal level of jihad and the da’wah. Finally the jihad by the hand, emphasizes the choice to strive in the way of Allah and taking action against injustice.[7] Sunni, Hanbali scholar Ibn Qayyim offers a similar separation, citing three jihads: the jihad of one’s self, the jihad against Satan, and the jihad against the hypocrites and disbelievers. The first two both fall under the banner of inner struggle or greater jihad, whereas hypocrites are reprimanded by the jihad by tongue, and disbelievers are called to Islam.[8] Shi’i interpretation of jihad is substantively akin to that of Sunni scholars, albeit with a greater emphasis upon the social justice, as triumphed in the Shi’a tenet of Ashoura.[9]

Black Standard of 'Jihad,' bearing the shahada, used by the Taliban 1997-2001, still in use by some mujahideen groups


Undeniably, there is a considerable amount of Islamic scholarship disagreeing with the nature of the greater jihad, vehemently championing the physical defense of Islam above all else.[3] One can however notice a correlation between the prevalence of this opinion and the historical conditions facing the Caliphate. Ibn Rushd and Ibn Qayyim were writing during the heights of Fatimid and Abbasid dynasties respectively, times when the Islamic World was flourishing. The Crusades had a slight effect on Muslim sentiment and interpretation but it was minimal when compared to the effect of the modern era. The true escalation of jihad was in response to the subjugation of the Islamic Caliphate’s Ottoman successor to the imperatives of Imperial Europe, the Allies’ betrayal of Arab aspirations after the First World War and colonization of the region, the rise of Israel, and the continued interference of the Cold War hegemons, breeding conflict after conflict in the region.  Founded in 1928, the Islamic fundamentalist, Muslim Brotherhood exemplified this escalation, concisely summarized in their motto, “Allah is our purpose, the Prophet our leader, the Quran our constitution, jihad our way and dying for God our supreme objective.” Extremists extended the label of infidel to Jews and Christians and this idea prevailed in the region after the Arabs devastating in loss in the 1967 War. Modern history confirms the increased prevalence of violent jihad in response to apparent assaults on Islam. But Islam was challenged in the times of Muhammad and the Rashidun as well - the true spirit of greater jihad was not sacrificed for the sake of militancy, and the Umma not only survived but flourished in the light of spiritual jihad.


What is crucial to understand from this microcosm of scholarship and jurisprudence is the depth and diversity of thought in Islamic scholarship and the reason inherent in Islam, almost all of which Muslim extremists have diluted and denied. Instead they promote only the idea of militant jihad [2] relying upon both Muslim and Western ignorance, their recruitment dependent upon the lacking knowledge of Muslim youth, and aided by the latter’s unenlightened mirroring of their rhetoric, vindicating them. Education is the enemy of extremism and their crime, hirabah, is already known to Islamic jurisprudence and the Sharia’ they, the extremists, claim to represent.


Hirabah (حِرابة)is an Arabic word connoting illegal [4] or sinful warfare that has fallen out of daily usage but the crime is forever enshrined in the fiqh of Sharia’ and the surat al-Ma’ida, 
 “The punishments of those who wage war against Allah and His Prophet and strive to spread disorder in the land are to execute them in an exemplary way or to crucify them or to amputate their hands and feet from opposite sides or to banish them from the land. Such is their disgrace in this world, and in the Hereafter theirs will be an awful doom save those who repent before you overpower them; you should know that Allah is Oft-Forgiving, Ever Merciful.” (5:33-34) 

Modern jurists Javed Ahmad Ghamidi and Shehzad Saleem interpret the crime of hirabah from this passage as defying justice, taking the law into one’s own hands, and spreading disorder in society, “by becoming a source of terror and intimidation for people, by committing mass murder, plunder, decoity [banditry or marauding] or robbery, by indulging in hijacking and terrorism and by committing other similar crimes,” the punishments for which are most severe. [10] Extremists’ deliberate mass murder of innocent women, children, and more often than not other Muslims, epitomizes hirabah, disregarding the right to life promised in Islam, 


“Because of that, We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for corruption in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely. And our messengers had certainly come to them with clear proofs. Then indeed many of them, [even] after that, throughout the land, were transgressors.” (5:32) Ultimately hirabah flies in the face of all that jihad stands for.

Washing fountain in al-Aqsa, Jerusalem, October 2013, DeRue
There is a sect of contemporary historians and scholars of Islam[2][4][10][11] leading a jihad of the tongue, to correctly redefine acts of terrorism as hirabah and those committing them as hirabis or hirabists. To characterize jihad, the internal struggle every Muslim confronts to strive in the way of Allah, as “holy war,” is to indict the entirety of Islam with a wrongful accusation of savage belligerency. Likewise in referring to terrorists as jihadis and jihadists, “we are calling them meritorious Muslims — then we are implying that we are fighting Islam." Abu al-Fadl, well known for his ardent discourse accosting Muslim extremists, believes this change of language would be well received in the dar al-Islam, with Muslims finding the West for once respecting their faith and legal tradition.[2] And one can only imagine the difficulty extremists would face recruiting young Muslims for suicidal terrorism, when their crime of hirabah is recognized.[11] Thus far Muslim extremists have succeeded in created a symbol with their corruption of “jihad,” convincing the West of Islam's relentless hatred for it, and garnering tacit support or at least silence from a majority of the Muslim population. [4] But this is not jihad. And it’s the responsibility of both the West to educate itself and respect Islam and of Muslims to defend their faith from the subjugation of hirabah. 

The importance of this issue enough cannot be stressed enough. Hirabah and jihad are more than words, they’re perspectives. And if peace is our ambition then we need to recognize our true enemies and turn the fight upon them. I will not deny the injustices of history done upon so many. We must live with the sins of our fathers, but we need not repeat them. A war was declared upon peace and the virtue of Islam. The time to lead our own jihad of the tongue, hand, and heart, and perhaps sword as well has come.

al-jihad fii sabilillah, Vincent Kessler - Reuters


[1] Brustad, Kristen, Mahmoud. Baṭal, and Abbas Tūnisī. Al-kitāb Fī Taʻallum Al-ʻarabīya: = a Textbook for Arabic Part Two. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2007. Print.



[2] Abu El Fadl, Khalid, Reza Aslan, and Douglas Streusand. "The War on the Word 'Jihad' : NPR." NPR.org. NPR, 30 Oct. 2006. Web. <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6392989>.



[3] Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005. Print.



[4] Crane, Robert D. "Hirabah versus Jihad." IRFI - Islamic Research Foundation International, Inc. Irfi.org, 2012. Web. <http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_301_350/hirabah_versus_jihad.htm>.



[5] Goldschmidt, Arthur, and Lawrence Davidson. A Concise History of the Middle East. 10th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013. Print.



[6] Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., and Sherifa Zuhur. "Islamic Rulings on Warfare." Strategic Studies Institute (2004): n. pag. U.S. Army War College . Web. <http://books.google.jo/books/about/Islamic_Rulings_on_Warfare.html?id=HlZRRPXvEsAC&redir_esc=>



[7] Hendricks, Seraj, Ahmad Hendricks, and Hisham Kabbani. "Jihad: A Judicial Ruling." As-Sunnah Foundation of America — Unity, Knowledge and Understanding for the Muslim Community. The Muslim Magazine. Web. <http://www.sunnah.org/fiqh/jihad_judicial_ruling.htm>.



[8] Al-Munaajiid, Muhammad Saleh. "Jihad: Not Only Fighting." Living Shari'ah. 12 May 2003. Print.



[9] Moghadam, Assaf. "The Shi'i Perception of Jihad." al Naklah (2003): Web.



[10] Ghamidi, Javed Ahmad, and Shezad Saleem. "The Penal Law of Islam." Monthly Renaissance - Home. 51-K Model Town Lahore Pakistan, Nov. 2013. <http://www.renaissance.com.pk/septfeart2y2.html>.



[11] Guirard, Jim, and Robert D. Crane. "Hirabah versus Jihad: Rescuing Jihad from The al Qaeda Blasphemy." The American Muslim (TAM). The American Muslim (TAM), 6 July 2003. Web. <http://theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/terrorism_hirabah_versus_jihad_rescuing_jihad_from_the_al_qaeda_blasphemy>.

Friday, June 13, 2014

Kurdistan Rising


Major Points
-The Kurdish Regional Government is sheltering Iraqi refugees
-Kurdish Peshmerga Forces have secured Kirkuk, Iraq from the ISIL
-Kurdish national interest in territorial expansion in Iraq to Mosul
-Turkish conflict of interest, Kurdish Oil vs. Kurdish secession in Turkey
-Supporting Peshmerga forces – a wise investment for the US?

June 11, Erbil - Peshmerga Soldier guards incoming refugees from Mosul, Reuters
Securing Kirkuk

Around this time a year ago, I found myself in a compact hotel gym in the west end of Amman, somewhat tactlessly asking an Iraqi I had just met (tactless by American standards – Arabs are fairly direct) about the security situation in his country. At the time the fervor of a potential American strike against the Assad Regime in Syria had consumed the region, and news from Iraq was sparse, aside from the reports of sectarian violence and mosques being bombed. I wasn’t going to miss the opportunity for a first hand account. He nodded solemnly about the Sunni-Shia conflict in the south, but suggested that northern Iraq was perfectly safe and worth a visit, that is Iraqi Kurdistan. When asked if he was a Kurd, he smirked, nodded, and continued “My family is safe and I am successful, what more could a man want?”

I hope this still holds true in light of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant seizing control of Baghdad’s northern and western tributaries this week, namely the cities of Mosul, Baiji, Tikrit, and Samarra, and Ramadi and Falluja, respectively. And it very well might. While Iraqi Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki is holed up in Baghdad alongside the majority of the Iraqi security forces who abandoned their posts when ISIL militants attacked, it would appear the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are not simply holding their own along the border of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan. They have succeeded in securing the city of Kirkuk in the Ta’mm province after briefly clashing with the ISIL following the Iraqi security forces’ retreat.

However while taking in 200,000-300,000 Iraqi refugees fleeing the ISIL in Mosul, in addition to ~200,000 Syrian refugees already in northern Iraq, was an act of humanitarian altruism, securing Kirkuk Thursday morning, was not. The oil laden city, often considered a “Kurdish Jerusalem,” has long been the subject of opposing claims from the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil and Iraq proper. In the past two days, Maliki’s administration may as well have dropped that claim all together.

Qala Erbil, Tom Blackwell

                Kurdish Ambition and Iraqi Acquiescence 

On June 11th despite economic and territorial tensions between them, Baghdad called upon the autonomous Kurdish region to aid Iraqi Security Forces against the ISIL threat. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s did not comply with Maliki’s request for reinforcement immediately– not that the Iraqi Security Forces’ rapid rate of retreat would have provided for any extensive cooperation if it had. Rather, the Kurdish authority perceptibly deliberated on the matter; but Peshmerga forces have since been deployed. Speculation over concessions being made by Baghdad to secure this Kurdish assistance soon followed the brief impasse although the Kurdistan Regional Government had denied any such gestures. 

However, with Kirkuk under Kurdish control as of June 12th after Baghdad having essentially green lighted Kurdish military expeditions on northern Iraqi soil, any future Iraqi land ‘concessions’ will only be the attempts of Maliki’s administration to save face. Effectively as of this moment Kirkuk is Kurdish. The Iraqi parliament has little say in the matter, as they're dependent upon the Peshmerga’s assistance and protection of Iraqi refugees. Barring the interference of foreign powers, Maliki's administration has effectively conceded any territory secured to the Kurds in exchange for maintaining a northern front against the Sunni militants. But is further territorial expansion the Kurdish intention at this time with the ISIL looming just miles away?

1992, Map of the Kurdish Population, CIA -edited to include the current borders of Iraqi Kurdistan
In a quote given to Al Jazeera, Shoresh Haji, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, lays bare the current Kurdish mentality, “I hope that the Kurdish leadership will not miss this golden opportunity to bring Kurdish lands in the disputed territories back under Kurdish control. It is a very sad situation for Mosul, but at the same time, history has presented us with only one or two other moments at which we could regain our territory and this is an opportunity we cannot ignore. We must regain the territory and protect its inhabitants from attack by the terrorists. This time we must stay on the Kurdish land and then negotiate with Baghdad, not withdraw and then negotiate.” By all means, while conscious of the renewed threat of Sunni militant neighbors the Kurdistan Regional Government is readily aware of Iraq’s weakness and the historic opportunity at hand. It seems it’s no longer a question of if the Kurdistan Regional Government will seek to expand, but when and how far? As the map above reveals, the Kurdish people had diffused considerably further south in Iraq, by as early as 1992, than the borders allotted the Kurdish Regional Government with Iraqi republic’s renewal in 2005 (denoted by blue outline, sharing the north eastern border of Iraq). Ideal Kurdish expansion in Iraq would likely stretch to Mosul and the surrounding territories as well.

But what would this mean for said “inhabitants,” namely Iraqi nationals who do not identify as Kurdish, but live in these lands? Erbil has been an incredibly generous host thus far, reopening its schools –closed for summer- to shelter the influx of Iraqi refugees, providing them with electricity and water. Should Peshmerga fighters advance on cities held by the ISIL I would expect them to be welcomed as liberators by the Iraqi people and I have faith that the Kurdistan Regional Government would treat them justly, lest it conduct elicit international sanctions paralyzing their nascent economy just beginning to see wealth of oil production. Some conflict might arise with a Kurdish bid for independence in the future, however if that were the case, a few Iraqis in their territory would be the least of their concerns.
Despite this theorized territorial expansion and murmurs of independence that would accompany it, little love would be lost between Iraq and Kurdistan. While Maliki’s Iraq is certainly not Saddam’s regime, which committed genocide against the Kurdish people during the al-Anfal campaign at the close Iran-Iraq War, employing chemical weapons against Kurdish soldiers and civilians alike, the Kurdish and Iraqi governments have grown increasingly estranged since 2012. The autonomous Kurdish region has been continuously inching towards independence. Just last week, Erbil announced the sale over one million barrels of Kurdish oil to world markets through the Turkish port of Ceyhan, without Baghdad’s authorization. Now with the sudden shift in the geo-strategic balance in Iraq resulting from the ISIL invasion, it would seem Kurdish territorial and national aspirations are materializing before their eyes and effectively the Iraqi government has already consented to it, hoping simply to salvage what remains of their country when the smoke clears.

A Conflict of Turkish Interests

The movement of the Peshmerga forces however has not gone unnoticed on the international stage. If there was ever a time in the 21st century when territorial expansion might not only be tolerated but tacitly supported by the majority of the world, it would be here and now. In its desperation, Baghdad has already consented and few if any states would oppose stemming the advances of the ISIL. However, this mounting Kurdish ambition does trouble the other states housing Kurdish populations, such as Iran and Syria, but most notably Turkey.

As the aforementioned Kurdish oil’s access to a Turkish port might’ve hinted, Turkey and Kurdistan Regional Government maintain a special trade alliance and economic relationship, with Turkish goods flooding Kurdistan, whilst Kurdish exports reach the world through Turkish ports. However Ankara is acutely aware that the actions of the Peshmarga and Kurdish national aspirations in Iraq, will only spur on Kurdish secessionists in Anatolia, namely the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which is considered a terrorist organization by NATO and the European Union. Likewise if Erdogan was to aid his Kurdish ally in Iraq against the ISIL, he’d risk losing the footing he’d established in Syria; Turkey has tolerated the growth of this al-Qaeda offshoot to destabilize both the Assad Regime and the foothold the Syrian Kurds had carved out in the north east. Conversely, Turkish oil interests in northern Iraq are certainly in jeopardy with the ISIL occupation and Turkey would enjoy the unhindered flow of Kurdish oil, free of Baghdad’s control. Ankara will play the field for the time being with their final decision being predicated on Washington’s course of action. Whilst neither outcome is without cost,Turkey does stands to benefit in either instance.

December 2012 -  Kurdish Tanks 250km from Baghdad, Reuters
 The Military Capability of the Peshmerga   

As Washington deliberates on the proper response to the ISIL offensive, officials would do well to remember the events leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. In July 2002, the CIA Special Activities Division was already on the ground in northern Iraq, followed closely, by 10th Special Forces Group (Airbourne) to organize and train the Peshmerga. Kurdish sabotage teams proved effective at infiltrating regime territory and choking off Iraqi Army supply lines. Likewise Kurdish intelligence that al-Qaeda affiliates, fleeing Afghanistan in 2002 had taken up residence in the mountains along the north east border proved true. Consequently in 2003 the joint effort of the Peshmerga, the CIA SAD, and 10th Special Force Group, known as the Northern Iraq Liaison Element, engaged Ansar al-Islam and successfully liberated the mountain territories, albeit some of the enemy combatants did slip back into Iran. Perhaps the truest testament to the capability of the Peshmerga was at the very start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. When the complexities of the US-Turkish relationship prevented coalition forces from entering Iraq from the North, NILE stood alone against Saddam’s forces and succeeded in preventing the northern army from meeting the invading coalition forces in the south, saving countless US lives. Admittedly these feats took place over 10 years ago, but they demonstrate the Peshmerga’s ability to work alongside U.S. Special Forces. Likewise in the realm of raw military capability the Peshmerga could still prove a wise investment.

Current estimates place the Peshmerga around 200,000 strong, and relatively armed to teeth for a nation without a state. Kurdistan was never commanded to disarm in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom and was consequently able to collect the armaments left behind by Saddam’s forces. Historically however, the Peshmerga’s training been economically limited, but now with the rise of their oil economy they can finally afford ammo to sufficiently train on their heavy weaponry as well. And as evidenced in Kirkuk, the Peshmerga are able to combat the ISIL, despite its access to arms left behind by Iraqi security forces. Certainly a part of these weapons have gone to the conflict in Syria already, but these Sunni militants are more than aware of the value of oil producing cities like Baiji and Kirkuk. It would be naïve to think the ISIL, which has exhibited unprecedented organization in this offensive, would’ve left Kirkuk minimally equipped. Nevertheless the Kurdish forces succeeded in securing it.

From a point of strategy, the ISIL has also turned its primary attention in Iraq upon Baghdad and Shia holy sites of Karbala and Najah in the south, making an attack from the Kurdish north ideal. And albeit outside the realm of physical evidence of military capability, a sociologist might also point to their history, noting that their misfortunes are arguably second in the region only to the Palestinian people, and recognize the resolve it has forged within them. The United States trained and armed two nations to oppose al-Qaeda and tyranny during our time in Iraq. When the time came and ISIL offensive began, one dropped its guns and fled, the other saw an opportunity for territorial expansion and met the ISIL head on. Which would you back?  

Admittedly Ankara may be displeased with such a decision in the short-term, although in this age of de facto states and ethnic identities giving way to autonomous nations, Turkey will have to come to terms with its Kurdish population soon enough. Some more cautious US officials may be concerned of losing Erdogan’s support, to maintain pressure on northern shore of the Black Sea, should the PKK become dangerously active again and this is a valid consideration. I'm certain Washington can find leverage over Ankara if it came to that however. Ultimately, as long as Kurdistan is still dependent upon Turkish ports and their economic relationship remains intact, ideally Erdogan should consent.

For Baghdad, losing territory to Kurdistan, may only increase sectarian tensions in the short term. Some concerns have been raised about Maliki's reaction to Kurdish advances. As stated, he's effectively sacrificed any claim to the disputed territories, but Kurdish leadership would be wise to keep a weary eye on the southern horizon, lest Iraqi artillery fire be ill-aimed or ill-timed. If Iraq is ever to make any substantial progress however, it needs to establish a government that equitably represents both sects of Islam and isn’t a chess piece in a larger Sunni-Shia, Saudi-Iranian game for control of the Middle East. A security force that doesn’t flee at the sight of a black flag might be preferable as well. A pipedream, indeed. In the meantime in the interest of effective military intervention, minimal US ground presence, and avoiding the old paradigm of 'having to destroy a country to save it,' perhaps we let the Kurds have their day?